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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the role of democracy in environmental quality and the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC).  Some studies in the EKC literature have examined the extent to which 
democratic nations are more or less apt to have improving environmental conditions, but they have 
drawn from static measures of a nation’s current regime. In this paper we examine panel data from 
1960 to 2001 and analyze the extent to which both the current level and the stock of a country’s 
democracy have significant and independent effects on a nation’s sulfur and carbon dioxide 
emissions.  While we find no evidence for the short-run effect of the current level of democracy, we 
find strong evidence that long-term democracy stock helps lower sulfur and carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
 
 
Keywords: Environmental Kuznets Curve; political economy of environment; sulfur emissions; 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 Why do some countries pollute more than others?  Why and how do countries’ pollution 
levels change over time?  A great deal of both scholarly and policy work has paid increasing 
attention in recent years to the relationship between rising incomes and environmental quality.  A 
hypothesis has emerged in this burgeoning literature that initial increases in a nation’s income may 
have an adverse effect on environmental quality, but that environmental conditions will 
subsequently improve as income increases over time (the Environmental Kuznets Curve, or EKC).  
A handful of new studies have presented an alternative hypothesis that the level of a nation’s 
democracy is also an important determinant of environmental quality.  In democracies, these 
scholars argue, those affected by and concerned with the environment will have a greater voice in 
political decision making and will put pressure on governments and businesses to clean up their 
act—and the environment. 
This paper reassesses the EKC relationship and considers it in conjunction with the 
hypothesis that democracy may improve environmental quality.  More specifically, we introduce the 
concept of “democracy stock” to that literature.  Democracy stock refers to the accumulation and 
evolution of democratic institutions over time.  A few studies in the EKC literature have examined 
the extent to which democratic nations are more or less apt to have improving environmental 
conditions.  However, such studies have typically drawn from static measures of the level of a 
nation’s democracy at a given point in time to perform their analyses.  This paper is the first that we 
are aware of in the EKC literature to analyze the concept of democracy stock.  Within political 
science, we believe it to be the first to consider the impact of democracy stock on the environment.  
This paper examines panel data from 1960 to 2000 to analyze the extent to which both the current 
level and stock of a country’s democratic history—the accumulation and strength of democracy over 
time—have had significant and independent effects on nations’ sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions.  
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We find little evidence to support the argument that the current level of democracy is associated 
with environmental improvement, but substantial evidence that a long history of strong democracy 
can help reduce pollution emissions.  In short, democracy matters, but only in the long run. 
Following this brief introduction the next section of the paper provides a short overview of 
the EKC literature and is followed by a section on the relatively smaller subset of works that deal 
with the democracy and environment question.  The fourth section of the paper introduces our 
methodology and data, while the fifth discusses our results.  The final section of the paper 
summarizes our findings and draws out lessons for future research and policy. 
 
2.  The Determinants of Environmental Quality 
 
 Any contemporary empirical investigation that aims to identify the cross-national 
determinants of environmental quality must first situate itself within the EKC literature.  The EKC 
invokes the landmark work of Simon Kuznets (1963).  Kuznets published a highly influential study 
implying that growth in per capita income over time first increases inequality, then later decreases it.  
Development policymakers evoked this theory for decades to argue that inequality could be ignored 
in the short term. 
In a now-classic study attempting to estimate the environmental impacts of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in Mexico, Grossman and Krueger (1995) reported a 
similar relationship between environmental degradation and levels of income—hence the term 
Environmental Kuznets Curve.   As countries begin to raise their incomes, rates of natural resource 
depletion and environmental pollution should proceed rapidly.  As incomes reach higher levels later 
in time, they are able to lower their levels of environmental degradation.  Figure 1 depicts this 
relationship graphically. 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
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Perhaps even more illuminating than the empirical findings are the theoretical insights these 
authors postulated to explain this inverted-U relationship between environment and growth.  They 
identified three mechanisms by which rising incomes could affect the environment: scale, 
composition, and technique effects. Scale effects occur when liberalization causes an expansion of 
economic activity.  If the nature of that activity is unchanged but its scale is growing, then pollution 
and resource depletion will increase along with output.  
Composition effects occur when increased trade leads nations to specialize in the sectors 
where they enjoy a comparative advantage.  When comparative advantage derives from differences 
in environmental stringency, the composition effect of trade will exacerbate existing environmental 
problems in the countries with relatively lax regulations.  Race-to-the-bottom discussions are 
perfectly plausible in this vein of economic theory.  The Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) theory in trade 
economics postulates that nations will enjoy a comparative advantage in those industries that use 
their abundant factors intensively.  Applying the H-O theory to pollution, it could be argued that a 
country with less stringent environmental standards would be factor-abundant in the ability to 
pollute.  Therefore, trade liberalization between a country with more stringent regulations and one 
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with more lenient rules may lead to an expansion in pollution-intensive economic activity in the 
nation with the lesser regulations.  The country with the less stringent regulations, often a 
developing nation, becomes a “pollution haven” for pollution intensive economic activity (Copeland 
and Taylor, 2003). 
 Technique effects, or changes in resource extraction and production technologies, can 
potentially lead to a decline in pollution per unit of output over time for two reasons.  First, 
multinational corporations may transfer cleaner technologies to developing countries.  Second, if 
income levels increase, newly affluent citizens may demand (and be able to afford) a cleaner 
environment.  (Of course, such an argument implies a heretofore poorly understood or 
substantiated political mechanism for the transmission of such demands.)   These three effects 
interact together to form an inverted U: while growth (scale) will increase pollution, composition 
and technique effects will counteract those effects. 
A wide literature has developed around the notion of the EKC, and it is not well understood 
in policy circles.  Early EKC studies predicted the “turning point” (the peak of the inverted U 
depicted in Figure 1) at which environmental degradation may begin to decline to fall between 
$3,000 to $5,000 GDP per capita in 1985 PPP terms.  The first EKC study, by Grossman and 
Krueger, examined ambient concentrations of sulfur, smoke, and particulate matter.  They found 
turning points between $4,000 and $5,000 for sulfur and smoke, and an even lower turning point for 
particulates.  Early EKC analyses were also published as part of the World Bank’s World Development 
Report (1992).  In that volume, the turning points for ambient concentrations of sulfur and 
particulate matter ranged from $3,000 to $4,000 GDP per capita.  Such levels are quite close to mean 
global income. 
The standard EKC structural model has become: 
 
(1) 
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),( ZYfPOL =  
 
where POL is the level of pollution, Y is the level of income per capita,  and Z is a vector of non-
economic determinants of pollution levels. The regression models that examine these relationships 
more often than not use panel data and fixed effects models that are usually some variation of: 
 
(2) 
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Where P is population, ln is the natural logarithim, i are countries, t are years.  Numerous 
control variables and non-economic factors (Z) are also added as independent variables. The 
formula to calculate the turning point incomes were pollution per capita begins to decline with 
income is: 
 
(3) 
 
)).2/(exp( 21 ββτ −=  
 
Many policy advocates and policymakers have generalized from the EKC to argue that the 
environment can wait, because economic growth will eventually (and naturally) result in 
environmental improvements.  According to the academic literature, such claims are often 
misconstrued.  Five qualifications characterize the empirical evidence on the EKC (for 
comprehensive reviews see Stern, 2004): 
 
• Evidence for an EKC is limited to a small number of pollutants.  Thus far, evidence for 
an EKC relationship has been consistently found for ambient concentrations of localized air 
pollutants in OECD countries.  In particular, EKCs have been identified for pollutants such 
as sulfur and particulate matter.  The EKC relationship may exist for such (criteria) 
pollutants because their effects are more localized and subject to regulation.  For many other 
environmental problems, such as water pollution, municipal waste, carbon dioxide, and 
energy use, evidence of an EKC relationship has been questionable. 
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• Evidence for the EKC may be limited to the experience of developed nations.  Most 
of the studies that have found an inverted-U relationship have datasets dominated by or 
exclusive to OECD countries.  In the smaller number of studies representative of the 
developing nations, evidence for an inverted-U relationship has been ambiguous.  There is 
also a fallacy of composition insofar as the exit of polluting industries drives the composition 
effect in the OECD.  The ability of rich countries to lower pollution through this 
mechanism does not imply that all countries can do the same, or that global emissions are 
falling with OECD growth. 
• The range of turning point estimates is now significantly higher than original 
estimates.   Although some of the original studies had turning points in the $3,000 to 
$5,000 range, a number of studies have predicted much higher turning points. For example, 
studies have found turning points of $14,730 and $22, 675 for sulfur, $9,800 for particulate 
matter, and $35,000 for carbon dioxide.  In some cases, a second wave of environmental 
degradation occurred at higher levels of income.  Grossman and Krueger found that at 
income levels between $10,000 and $15,000 that levels of environmental degradation began 
to increase again. These studies suggest that environmental degradation could rise for 
decades before “turning around”—if it ever does. 
• Other significant factors, aside from national income, are important drivers of 
environmental change.  Variables such as population density, income inequality, economic 
structure, historical events (such as the oil price shocks of the 1970s), and the degree of 
political freedom and democracy in a nation have been found to be significantly correlated 
with levels of environmental degradation, in addition to or more importantly than income.  
These findings imply that environmental degradation, if it does decline, will not decline 
automatically as economic growth proceeds. 
 
It is to one these “other” determinants of environmental quality—political democracy—that we now 
turn. 
 
3.  Democracy and Environmental Quality 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, recent EKC studies have paid increasing attention to 
determinants of environmental quality other than national income.  A small but important number 
of these studies have examined the extent to which a nation’s level of democracy has a significant 
and independent effect on environmental quality.  This section of the paper reviews theoretical and 
empirical contributions to this element of the environmental quality debate and generates the 
working hypotheses tested in the empirical analysis to follow. 
 It has become almost commonplace among policymakers to assert a positive, fruitful 
relationship between democracy and the environment.  Indeed, Albert Gore, the 2007 Nobel Peace 
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Prize winner and perhaps the most well known public official advocate of environmental protection, 
has said that “an essential prerequisite for saving the environment is the spread of democratic 
government to more nations of the world”  (Gore 1992, 179). 
 While such assertions alone do not provide the basis for a plausible theory of democracy and 
the environment, the theoretical literature generally does lend them some support.  The most direct 
treatment of the subject from the political science literature comes from Payne (1995), who argues 
four essential reasons why more democratic governments will yield better environmental outcomes: 
 
1) Accountability.  Democratic governments are more accountable.  Thus, the environmental 
concerns of constituents cannot be ignored. 
2) Information.  Democracies tend to facilitate greater access to information.  Free presses and 
other forms of information will enable citizens to be more informed about environmental 
issues and discoveries. 
3) Civil society.  Environmentalists are more apt to associate in democracies.  Where freedom of 
speech and association exist, citizens are more likely to organize on environmental issues and 
pressure governments. 
4) International cooperation.  Democratic governments cooperate more amongst themselves and 
are therefore more likely to collaborate on international treaties to protect the environment. 
 
 Other work has stressed the importance of institutional development, especially over time 
(Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro 2007).  According to this line of thought, democracy tends to generate 
wider-reaching, more effective political institutions.  To the extent that strong institutions are a 
necessary prerequisite for governmental environmental protection initiatives, long-standing 
democracies would appear to hold distinct advantages over newer, less institutionalized democracies 
and personalistic dictatorships. 
 These advantages of democratic rule do not necessarily accrue immediately.  It takes time, 
and democratic depth, for the mechanisms of accountability to be established; for freedom of 
information and the press to generate a culture of an informed, inquisitive society; for the freedom 
of association to help generate a strong civil society environmental movement; for democracies to 
develop compatible, cooperative foreign policies that might generate international agreements to 
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protect the environment; and for democratic institutions to stabilize, develop, grow and take on 
added responsibilities in the environmental arena.  Given such constraints, we surmise that 
democracy is best considered as a cumulative stock rather than as a level at a given moment in time.  
Both the history and degree of democracy in a country must be jointly considered if we are to 
capture its full causal impact. 
 Other scholars claim that democracies will be more apt to have degraded environments.  
Desai (1998, 11) has argued that “as democracy is dependent on economic development, and since 
economic growth and prosperity generally result in environmental pollution and ecological 
destruction, democracy would not necessarily be protective of the environment.”  This argument, 
however, says little about the independent effects of democracy, separate and apart from income. 
 Over the past decade a small number of scholars have begun to test empirically the 
relationship between democracy and environmental quality in an EKC framework.  By and large, all 
of them support the view that democratic countries tend to have lower levels of environmental 
degradation, but none considers democracy as an historical phenomenon.  The majority of these 
studies econometrically examine cross-sectional or panel data in an EKC framework and add a 
contemporaneous measure of democracy as an independent variable.  These studies hypothesize and 
find (with a few exceptions) a statistically significant and positive correlation between democracy 
and environmental quality.  In other words, in any given year a democracy will experience decreasing 
(or less) pollution than non-democracies.  But none of these studies controls for a country’s history 
with democracy when testing the impact of its current level of democracy on the environment, and 
many are quite limited in their geographic scope and time frame. 
 Three of the earliest studies examining the relationship between democracy and the 
environment came up with results that differed with respect to the type of environmental medium 
under analysis.  Torras and Boyce (1998) examined the effect of democracy on levels of sulfur 
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dioxide, smoke, heavy particles, water pollution, and the percentage of the population with access to 
safe drinking water.  They found that their democracy variable (taken from Freedom House) was 
statistically significant and associated with environmental improvement in the majority of cases for 
low-income countries.  Scruggs (1998) used similar data to examine fecal coliform, particulate 
emissions, and dissolved oxygen and came to similar findings.  On a different set of pollutants, 
however, Midlarsky (1998), using a variety of indices, found that democratic countries tend to 
protect a higher percentage of their land area, but also have higher carbon dioxide emissions and 
deforestation rates. 
 Barrett and Graddy (2000) find that countries that are more democratic tend to have lower 
levels of sulfur dioxide emissions, smoke, particulates, arsenic, and lead.  Harbaugh and colleagues 
(2002) identified a statistically significant relationship between democracy and reduced sulfur 
dioxide, smoke, and particulates.  Neumayer (2002) essentially tests Payne’s hypothesis that 
democratic governments will be more apt to collaborate with each other on environmental issues.  
Using a number of indices of democracy, he found that democracies sign and ratify more 
multilateral environmental agreements and participate more in various international environmental 
forums.  A more recent paper by Farzin and Bond (2006) finds democracy associated with lower 
levels of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and sulfur dioxide. 
 
4.  Data and Method 
 
 This section of the paper describes our approach to investigating the extent to which 
democracy affects the level of environmental quality.   First, we discuss the limitations of existing 
analyses on this topic.  When then present a rationale for introducing measures of a country’s 
“stock” of democracy in addition to using the type of measures employed in previous studies.  
Third, we introduce the model we will be testing and the data used for our empirical analysis. 
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 Consensus seems to be growing around the notion that politics is closely linked to the level 
of environmental quality that countries enjoy, but such arguments are still relatively underdeveloped 
compared to the EKC and other findings.  Our analysis builds on and deepens this previous work 
by introducing a cross-national measure of the stock of a democracy over time. 
 To measure democracy, we employ the Polity2 measure from the latest Polity IV dataset (see 
Marshall and Jaggers 2000).  This variable measures the extent to which democratic or authoritarian 
“authority patterns” are institutionalized in a given country.  It takes into account how the executive 
is selected, the degree of checks on executive power, and the form of political competition.  The 
Polity2 ranking combines each country’s Authoritarianism and Democracy scores and ranges from -
10 to 10, with 10 being the most democratic (a fuller discussion of the Polity methodology can be 
found at www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity).1  Along with the Freedom House measures of democracy, 
the Polity variable is the most commonly used in the literature.  Though not perfect, it correlates 
highly with other existing measures of democracy and appears therefore to have a high degree of 
external validity.2
To create our stock measure of democracy we sum each country’s Polity2 score from 1900 
to the observation year, applying a one percent annual depreciation rate going back in time.  This 
means that a country’s regime stock stretches back over the course of the entire twentieth century, 
but that more distant years receive less weight than recent ones.  Our expectation is that the causal 
                                                 
1 To facilitate time-series analysis, the Polity2 measure fills in scaled Polity scores for observations that occur during 
political interregnums and transitions, which would otherwise be treated as missing values.  See 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/ for details. To correct for Polity2’s exclusion of micro-states, an omission that 
might bias our sample, we impute democracy scores for these excluded cases using other democracy indices that are 
conceptually and empirically close to the Polity2 measure.  These measures include: a) the Freedom House Political 
Rights indicator (http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=333&year=2007), b) Ken Bollen’s 
Liberal Democracy variable (Bollen 1993), c) Tatu Vanhanen’s Competition variable (Vanhanen 1990), d) Arthur Banks’s 
Legislative Effectiveness variable, and e) Banks’s Party Legitimacy variable (Banks 1994).  These measures of democracy 
take into account the degree to which citizens can participate freely in the political process, the extent of suffrage, the 
competitiveness of national-level elections, the degree of party competitiveness, and the degree to which the legislature 
affects public policy. 
2  Correlations between Polity2 and other common democracy indices are as follows:  “Political Rights” (Freedom 
House) = -0.85; “Liberal Democracy” (Bollen) =0.92; “Democracy index” (Vanhanen) = 0.85. 
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effect of democracy, like other capital stocks, cumulates but depreciates over time.  We choose the 
year 1900 as a threshold period that ushered in a period in which mass democracy becomes a world-
historical phenomenon (no longer restricted to the U.S. and a few European states).  We choose a 
one percent depreciation rate because it seems a reasonable estimation of how a long-run historical 
effect might play out, but the use of different rates of depreciation has little effect on results (not 
reported). 
Because the historical component of this index weighs heavily on our understanding of the 
concept and because the Polity dataset ignores non-sovereign states in its coding procedures, we 
supplement the Polity2 coding with our own coding of several nation-states that were previously 
part of contiguous empires.  This procedure assigns values to currently sovereign countries that were 
not independent during prior periods included in the calculation of the democracy stock variable.  
The procedure is as follows.  For each year that a nation-state belonged to a contiguous imperial 
power it receives the same Polity2 score as its imperial ruler; e.g., Estonia receives the same score as 
the Soviet Union from 1941 through 1990.  We use this procedure only for nation-states contiguous 
with the empire to which they previously belonged.  We assume that contiguous colonies are likely 
to be governed in the same manner as the imperial power itself, a dynamic less likely to be true for 
overseas colonies.3
Other studies have found a much more robust relationship between democracy stock and 
development than between democracy level and development.  Examples include Gerring et al. 
                                                 
3 This re-coding affects the following countries:  Albania (1900-1912, Ottoman Empire), Andorra (1900-present, 
France), Armenia (1900-1990, Russia/USSR), Azerbaijan (Russia/USSR 1900-1990), Belarus (Russia/USSR, 1900-1990), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-1917, Austria-Hungary; Yugoslavia 1929-1991), Croatia (1900-1917, Austria-Hungary; 
Yugoslavia 1929-1991), Czech Republic (1900-1917, Austria-Hungary), Slovakia (1900-1917, Austria-Hungary), Estonia 
(1900-1916 and 1941-1990, Russia/USSR), Finland (1900-1916, Russia), Georgia (1900-1990, Russia/USSR), Iraq (1900-
1917, Ottoman Empire), Israel (1900-1917, Ottoman Empire), Kazakhstan (1900-1990, Russia/USSR), Kyrgyzstan 
(1900-1990, Russia/USSR), Latvia (1900-1917 and 1941-1990, Russia/USSR), Lithuania (1900-1917 and 1941-1990, 
Russia/USSR), Macedonia (1922-1990, Yugoslavia), Moldova (1900-1945, Romania; 1946-1990, USSR), Mongolia (1900-
1920, China), Bangladesh (1947-1971, Pakistan), Slovenia (1900-1917, Austria-Hungary; Yugoslavia 1929-1991), Syria 
(1900-1917, Ottoman Empire), Tajikistan (Russia/USSR, 1900-1990), Turkmenistan (1900-1990, Russia/USSR), Ukraine 
(1900-1917 and 1920-1990, Russia/USSR), Uzbekistan (1900-1990, Russia/USSR), and East Timor (1976-1999, 
Indonesia). 
 12
(2005), who find that democracy stock increases the rate of economic growth.  Gerring, Thacker and 
Alfaro (2007) find similar results in the case of human development, with democracy stock 
effectively lower infant mortality rates.  Beer (2007) finds that democracy stock is associated with 
improved gender equality, and Brown (2007) links democracy stock to human capital and education.  
Finally, Thacker (2007) finds a strong relationship between democracy stock and market-oriented 
economic policies. 
 We build upon these recent advances in the political science literature by applying the 
democracy stock hypothesis to the environment.  To what extent does the stock of democracy in a 
given country affect its environmental quality over time?  How does this effect compare to that of 
the level of democracy at a given moment in time?  Does democracy yield environmental benefits 
immediately, or are these salutary effects more likely to emerge as a result of the accumulation of 
strong democratic rule over time? 
The environmental quality variables that we analyze are sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions.  
Sulfur is emitted from the combustion of coal and petroleum and contributes to smog and localized 
air pollution, acid rain, and global climate change.  We choose sulfur because of its characteristics as 
both a global and localized problem, and because of the availability of data.  As shown in Figure 2, 
global sulfur emissions have peaked in the world and are now on the decline. 
 
Figure 2: 
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Source: Stern, 2005 
 
Figure 3 presents global carbon dioxide emissions during the same period, in millions of 
metric tons.  Unlike sulfur, carbon dioxide emissions continue to increase.  Indeed, over 300 billion 
tons of carbon have been released to the atmosphere since 1750, with half of these emissions 
occurring since the mid-1970s.  Carbon dioxide is emitted chiefly from fossil fuels combustion (96 
percent), cement production, and gas flaring (Marland et al, 2006). Though emissions continue to 
rise, patterns in Figure 3 suggest that they may have begun to do so at a decreasing rate. 
Figure 3: 
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The underlying model for our analysis is: 
 
(4) 
 
ln(S /P) it = xit + β1 ln(Y /P)it + β2(ln(Y /P)) it2 + β3(lnY /P)) it3 + β4DEMLEVELit + β5DEMSTOCK it + εit , 
 
Where S is sulfur; Y is per capita income; DEMLEVEL and DEMSTOCK are the level and stock 
democracy variables described above; P is population and i are countries in t years.  (We use an 
equivalent model to estimate carbon emissions.)  Betas are the coefficients to be estimated.  We 
measure the level and stock democracy variables using the Polity2 indicator described above to 
examine the extent to which democracy level and stock have significant, independent effects on 
sulfur and CO2 emissions.  We also include vector of other covariates, or control variables.  
Consistent with previous studies, we control for urban population (as a percent of total population) 
and illiteracy rates.4  We also include a time trend variable to control for the possibly spurious 
correlation between heavily trended dependent and independent variables.  Finally, we introduce a 
cubed income term into the equation.  This has become common in most EKC studies.  Some have 
found that environmental quality initially increases with income, then declines, but increases again as 
incomes continue to grow (Torras and Boyce, 1998).  All independent variables are lagged by one 
year, except for democracy stock, which is lagged by two years (to separate it from the stock 
variable). 
 Controlling for these factors, including democracy level, we expect that the stock of 
democracy will be associated with lower sulfur and CO2 emissions.  In other words, the sign on BB
                                                
5 
 
4 The World Bank (2005) does not report illiteracy statistics for certain countries that have near 100% literacy rates.  For 
these cases, we hand-code a 0.5% illiteracy rate.  Illiteracy data for other countries are also somewhat limited.  We 
impute missing data using the following technique.  First, we fill in missing years between observed years of total adult 
illiteracy rates using linear interpolation.  Second, we use annual regional averages to fill in missing data in the new 
interpolated illiteracy variable. 
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should be negative and significant, indicating that as the stock of democracy increases in a particular 
nation over time, levels of sulfur and CO2 emissions decrease, all else being equal. 
If the income variables are statistically significant we will also calculate the turning point(s) 
for an EKC in our full sample estimations.  The formula to calculate the first turning point is: 
 
(5) 
 
)
2
42
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The second turning point can be calculated as: 
 
(6) 
 
)
2
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1
31
2
2
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−−−=  
 
 To perform these analyses we employ a time-series—cross-section (TSCS) data set from 
1960 to 2000 (2001 for CO2) for our analyses.  Data for sulfur are logged and come from a new 
database of global sulfur emissions from 1850 to 2000 constructed by David Stern at the Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute (for a full description, see Stern 2005).  Data for carbon dioxide, measured in 
metric tons per capita (and also logged), are from the World Bank (2005).  Data for other 
independent variables not defined above are also from the World Bank (2005).  Analyses employ a 
country fixed-effects format and Newey-West standard errors, which assume a heteroskedastic error 
distribution and apply a TSCS equivalent of Huber/White/sandwich, or “robust,” standard errors 
(Newey and West 1987).  We also include a one-period (AR1) correction for autocorrelation. 
 
5. Results 
 
To reiterate our research question, we examine the extent to which the stock of a nation’s 
democracy affects its levels of sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions.  We find that democracy stock 
 17
has a significant effect on the level of emissions of both substances in our sample, while the effect of 
the contemporaneous level of democracy is weak and inconsistent.  Interestingly, in relation to 
income and emissions, we find an S-shaped relationship for both pollutants.  In the early stages of 
income growth there is a decrease in sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions that is followed by an 
acceleration of such emissions when income continues to grow, ending with another decrease in 
emissions when a nation becomes fairly developed. 
 Tables 1 and 2 exhibit our results.  For comparative purposes we first estimated the equation 
with only the income and conditioning variables, excluding the democracy variables.  The results of 
that exercise are shown in the first columns of Tables 1 and 2 and labeled “EKC.” We then 
estimated separate equations for the level and stock of democracy, and another that includes both 
level and stock.  Columns two through four present these results.  Because our goal is to examine 
the independent effects of level and stock, we consider model four, which includes the level and 
stock variables together, the best test of our hypothesis.  Finally, we estimate equation (4) separately 
for members and non-members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD; these 
results appear in columns five and six. 
 Results for the current level of democracy do not suggest that democracy today has any 
noticeable impact on environmental quality for the world as a whole.  Tested alone and in 
conjunction with democracy stock, democracy level shows no significant relationship with emissions 
of sulfur and carbon.  (It emerges significant only in the case of developing countries’ sulfur 
emissions.)  In contrast, a country’s democracy stock has a strong, robust relationship to improved 
environmental conditions.  The more democracy stock a country accumulates, the lower will be its 
emissions of sulfur and carbon, all else being equal.  This result is robust to a wide variety of tests, 
many not reported here, and holds both when democratic level is included and when it is not.  (The 
only exception to this pattern is the finding for CO2 emissions in the wealthy countries, where 
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neither democracy nor income seem to exert much of an effect.  This non-finding may be due in 
part to the lack of variation across both the dependent and independent variables for this small 
group of countries.) 
We find an S-shaped EKC for sulfur and carbon dioxide, with two key turning points.  The 
signs indicate that in the very early stages of economic development, per capita sulfur emissions 
decline with income until a nation reaches about $132 to $135 per capita.  Then, sulfur emissions 
grow with income until they reach approximately $10,500 to $15,700, when they begin to decrease 
again. 
For CO2, the curve is longer, with the initial rise kicking in at about $31-33 and the later 
decrease not arriving until over $38,000, and at $41,153 for our “full” model (in 1995 dollars).  
Numerous studies have found no EKC relationship for CO2.  Those that have indicate a range of 
turning points from $15,000 to $99,000 (Perman and Stern, 2003; Galeotti et al., 2006; Neumayer, 
2002).  Recent work has shown that introducing energy prices into the estimation eliminates an 
EKC for CO2 in OECD countries (Richmond and Kaufman, 2006).  We, too, find that to be the 
case for the OECD DAC (not reported); however, results presented in Model 7 in Table 2 show 
that an EKC relationship still holds for the entire sample when the crude oil price variable is 
included.5
The results for sulfur are plausible from a scientific perspective.  At extremely low levels of 
income people are more apt to burn highly polluting, biomass fuel wood.  But as they become more 
skilled and their incomes rise, they begin to burn it more efficiently and also switch over to relatively 
cleaner coal and petroleum, leading to a decline in emissions up until the first turning point.  When a 
nation begins to industrialize, its use of fossil fuels becomes much more intensive, thus causing 
                                                 
5 The coefficient for the energy price variable is oddly positive.  Reassuringly for our purposes, coefficients on the 
democracy and income variables in the full model are remarkably robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the oil price 
variable. 
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increases in emissions between the first and second turning points.  When a nation passes the 
second turning point—somewhere between $10,000 and $16,000 GDP per capita, according to our 
results—a nation will be more likely to adopt pollution control technologies that reduce emissions. 
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Table 1:  Determinants of Global Sulfur Emissions, 1960-2000 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Variable 
EKC Level Stock Full OECD DAC 
Non-OECD 
DAC 
Democracy Level  -0.002  -0.001 -0.003 -0.007** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Democracy Stock   -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
   (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0004) 
Income -13.596*** -14.040*** -13.669*** -13.683*** 18.674 -9.749*** 
 (1.581) (1.577) (1.592) (1.592) (25.691) (1.719) 
Income squared 2.105*** 2.190*** 2.123*** 2.125*** -0.951 1.536*** 
 (0.220) (0.219) (0.222) (0.222) (2.757) (0.243) 
Income cubed -0.098*** -0.103*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.002 -0.071*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.098) (0.011) 
Illiteracy 0.144** 0.160** 0.139** 0.139** -0.653*** 0.208*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.120) (0.070) 
Urban population 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Trend -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.045*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Constant 19.196*** 19.983*** 19.366*** 19.390*** -93.112 10.877*** 
 (3.641) (3.635) (3.645) (3.648) (79.489) (3.959) 
Turning Points       
1 $135 $134 $132 $132   
2 $12,852 $10,577 $12,699 $15,691   
Observations 4899 4789 4753 4752 790 3962 
Countries 150 147 147 147 21 126 
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.77 0.15 
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  All independent variables lagged by one year, except 
for Democracy Stock, which is lagged by two years.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2:  Determinants of Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1960-2001 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Variable 
EKC Level Stock Full OECD DAC 
Non-OECD 
DAC 
Full w/oil 
prices 
Democracy Level  0.0001  0.0005 -0.0031 -0.002 0.001 
  (0.0018)  (0.0017) (0.0041) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
Democracy Stock   -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0004** -0.0003* 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Income -2.4615*** -2.5465*** -2.5418*** -2.5270*** -21.852 -0.779 -2.5021*** 
 (0.7005) (0.7054) (0.7055) (0.7073) (19.4490) (0.7965) (0.7051) 
Income squared 0.4762*** 0.4850*** 0.4828*** 0.4807*** 2.7501 0.2211** 0.4770*** 
 (0.0961) (0.0971) (0.0972) (0.0974) (2.0396) (0.1125) (0.0971) 
Income cubed -0.0227*** -0.0230*** -0.0228*** -0.0227*** -0.1102 -0.0103** -0.0225*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0711) (0.0051) (0.0043) 
Illiteracy -0.0061*** -0.0055*** -0.0040* -0.0040* -0.0236** -0.0019 -0.0041* 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0104) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Urban population 0.0092*** 0.0109*** 0.0105*** 0.0104*** 0.0129*** 0.0100*** 0.0104*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0029) 
Oil prices       0.0255** 
       (0.0130) 
Trend 0.0004 0.0004 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0038 0.0044** 0.0008 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0018) 
Constant 1.3691 1.545 1.4505 1.4167 55.4482 -2.4977 1.3168 
 (1.6668) (1.6748) (1.6759) (1.6795) (61.7677) (1.8610) (1.6722) 
Turning Points        
1 $31 $33 $33 $33    
2 $38,702 $38,740 $40,813 $41,153    
Observations 5211 5093 5094 5093 809 4284 5093 
Countries 159 156 156 156 21 135 156 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.62 0.39 0.4 
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  All independent variables lagged by one year, except 
for Democracy Stock, which is lagged by two years.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The results for CO2 are deeply troubling from a scientific and policy perspective.  The 
results follow a similar logic as those for sulfur, but the first turning point comes earlier in the 
development process and the second later.  As in the case of sulfur, one would look at these results 
and hypothesize that at the outset, countries are apt to reduce their per capita emissions as they 
substitute coal and petroleum for biomass fuel wood.  But very soon (at less than $35 in per capita 
income in 1995 prices), emissions begin to rise and continue to do so as the use of coal and 
petroleum becomes more intense.  The next turning point does not occur until per capita incomes 
reach somewhere in the $38,000-42,000 range, where a nation will be more likely to adopt pollution 
control technologies to reduce per capita emissions.  If one estimated a generous 2.5 percent GDP 
per capita average annual world growth rate looking forward, it would take at least seven decades for 
world CO2 emissions to “turn around” under this model.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change argues that the world must begin to reduce emissions by 2020. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Contrary to earlier studies on this topic, this paper argues that, for the most part, there is no 
strong relationship between a country’s current regime type (democracy level) and environmental 
quality.  Instead, we find that a causal relationship between democracy and environmental quality is 
more likely to emerge when we view democracy a long-run, cumulative phenomenon.  We believe 
that this result makes sense not only empirically, but also theoretically.  It takes time for the 
machinations of democracy to yield tangible instrumental gains (outside of their own intrinsic 
benefits).  Democratic history is typically replete with tales of intermittent progress, punctuated by 
occasional setbacks but more characterized by incremental advances that build upon each other to 
promote social welfare over the long run.  Democracy can help improve the environment, but only 
if given time to promote mechanisms of accountability, facilitate information, foster associational 
life, spur international cooperation, and promote institutional development. 
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 These findings have important implications for both theory and policy.  From a theoretical 
perspective, Payne’s initial and landmark insights into the relationship between democracy and the 
environment should be broadened.  Indeed, as Payne indicates, in democracies citizens are better 
informed about the environment, can better express their concerns about the environment, can 
organize amongst each other around those concerns, and finally put pressure on governments to 
improve environmental conditions.  However, our results imply that these factors are not likely to 
exert their effects overnight, that they are likely to take some time to develop.  A nation with a 
longer history of freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom to 
vote will be more apt to make significant improvements in environmental quality than a nation that 
has just undergone a transition. 
 If citizens can witness that their predecessors have raised demands concerning 
environmental problems, organized around those problems, and successfully pressured policymakers 
to make change, they will be more apt to build on the movement of the past.  Civil societies need to 
build momentum over time, norms need to be developed to support greater demands for 
environmental quality, political competition needs to be routinized, and government institutions 
need capacity strengthening before we should expect to witness significant and lasting reversals of 
environmental degradation. 
 There are two major policy implications of this study.  First, we must underscore the fact 
that factors beyond the level of a nation’s income determine environmental quality.  This paper adds 
to the growing number of studies that have shown that growth in per capita income alone will not 
automatically improve the environment.  Put simply, the world cannot afford to wait for the 
problem to fix itself (more precisely, for economic development to generate the ability and incentive 
to clean up the environment), especially in the case of carbon dioxide.  We must find other levers to 
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bring to bear on the problem, especially political levers.  In this particular case, we find that 
democracy matters, and that it matters in a particular (time-dependent) manner. 
 On the other hand, this paper implies that simply transitioning into a democracy will not 
automatically change environmental problems overnight.  Our results indicate that it may be 
unreasonable to expect a brand new, fledgling democracy to have the capacity to reverse what may 
be decades or more of environmental degradation.  But with concentrated effort on the part of 
democratic and international actors to allow the press and civil society to flourish, and to establish 
the most appropriate government institutions, laws, and social norms that go along with respecting 
the environment, substantial progress can be made over time. 
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